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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellant's claims on the basis that 
Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not 
appeal the Board's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals and instead filed in 
district court? 
Standard of review: Correctness. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668 (Utah 
1989). Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988); Penrod 
v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). 
Issue Preserved at: [R. 254; 290-294; 343-347]. 
2. Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellant's claim for "wrongful 
termination" on the basis that the City's employee manual did not create an 
implied contract between the City and Appellant? 
Standard of review: Correctness. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 119 P.2d 668 (Utah 
1989). Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Naf I Bank, 161 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988); Penrod 
v. Nu Creation Crerne, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). 
Issue Preserved at: [R. 214; 252-253; 287-289; 340-343]. 
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
1. The Appellant in this case (who was Plaintiff in the underlying trial case) is Darwin 
Kocherhans (hereinafter, "Appellant") a resident of Utah County, Utah. 
2. The Appellees in this case are Orem City (hereinafter, the "City"), a Utah municipal 
corporation [R. 260] and Jeffrey W. Pedersen (hereinafter, "Pedersen"), employed by 
or acting as agent of the City of Orem. [R. 260]. 
3. For ease of reference, this Brief will refer to the City and Pedersen together as the 
"Appellees." 
4. This appeal requires the Court to determine the following questions of law: 
(1) Whether : (a) Appellant qualifies for exemption under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1105; (b) Appellant must exhaust the remedies set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1106 even though Appellant is exempt from the procedural requirements 
of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105; and (c) the City's Handbook sufficiently 
defines Appellant's position vis-a-vis Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105's 
definitions for "head of a department" and "deputy of a head of a 
department." 
(2) Whether the language in Orem's Employee Manual, Section 3 "Human 
Resource Policies and Procedures Manual," which provides "[n]othing in this 
manual implies or is part of an employment contract" negates Appellant's 
claim for wrongful termination under an implied employment contract and 
where Appellant has alleged that Appellees violated Section 3 policies with 
respect to notice of performance deficiencies and termination. 
Course of Proceedings/Disposition of trial court. 
5. On August 10, 2009, Appellant filed a Complaintlin the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County against Appellees. [R. 217]. 
6. In the Complaint, Appellant alleged the following seven causes of action: 
(1) Wrongful Termination; 
(2) Breach of Contract; 
(3) Tortious Interference with Current and Prospective Economic Relations; 
(4) Defamation, Slander, and Libel; 
(5) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; 
(6) Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment; and 
(7) Respondeat Superior [R. 217]. 
7. Appellees filed an Ex-parte Motion for heave to File Overlength Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Dismiss on September 9, 2009. [R. 222]. 
8. On September 11, 2009, the trial court granted Appellees' Motion for Leave to File 
Overlength Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Appellees filed 
their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. [R. 229; 268]. 
9. On October 8, 2009, Appellant submitted a Memorandum in Response to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. [R. 300]. 
10. Appellees filed an Ex-parte Motion for Leave to File Overlength Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and their accompanying memorandum on 
October 29, 2009. [R. 303; 321]. 
11. On October 30, 2009, Appellees filed a Request to Submit for Decision. [R. 324]. 
12. After the trial court heard oral arguments on February 4-5, 2010 and again on March 
30, 2010, the court entered a Memorandum Decision on April 21, 2010. [R. 351]. 
13. On June 9, 2010, the district court filed an Order Dismissing Case. [R. 354]. 
14. Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal on July 7, 2010. \R. 358]. 
STATEMENT OF T H E FACTS 
15. The City is a government municipality within Utah County, Utah. Pedersen is the 
Administrative Services Director for the City. [R. 217]. 
16. Appellant held various positions with the City during the course of his 28-year 
employment there. [R. 216]. 
17. While employed with the City, Appellant consistently received better than average 
and exemplary performance ratings. [R. 216]. 
18. Appellant was promoted from Assistant Treasurer to Treasury Division Manager 
(City Treasurer) in 2006 and continued to receive above-satisfactory performance 
reviews in this new position, including the review received only five months prior to 
his termination. [R. 216]. 
19. On September 15, 2008, Appellant received a Notice of Intent to Terminate ("Notice") 
from his supervisor, Pedersen. In the Notice^ Pedersen noted that Appellant had a 
"pattern of neglect of duty, frequent errors and a general inability to complete the 
functions of [the] office." [R. 176-178; 216; 350]. 
20. Pursuant to administrative procedures outlined in the Orem Employee Handbook, 
(hereinafter, "Handbook"), Appellant timely appealed the termination decision to 
Pedersen. [R. 215-216; 260]. 
21. Pedersen was both the supervisor issuing the termination notice and the Director 
who was to review the decision to terminate Appellant. [R. 215]. 
22. Pedersen denied Appellant's appeal. [R. 215; 260]. 
23. Pedersen terminated Appellant effective September 24, 2008 for "performance 
deficiencies." [R. 215]. 
24. According to the "Disciplinary Procedures" outlined in the City's Handbook on 
pages 131 through 141, there are a number of informal and formal disciplinary 
actions that may be taken prior termination. Specifically, on page 131 under the 
heading "Disciplinary Procedure", Policy 2 indicates that "Disciplinary actions shall 
be limited in severity commensurate with the infraction(s) in question and/or past 
infractions." [R. 44; 215]. 
25. Prior to receiving the Notice, Appellant had never been subject to any disciplinary 
notice or proceedings. Furthermore, prior to issuing the Notice, the City took no steps 
to correct any errors or address any performance concerns through "informal" action 
or discipline.1 [R. 214]. 
26. Appellant was never trained by his supervisor with respect to some of the alleged 
mistakes, and did not receive any notice to correct mistakes after the errors were 
committed. [R. 174]. 
27. Pedersen's remarks in the Notice were made part of Appellant's employee record and 
were used by the City of Orem Employee Appeal Board (the "Board") in determining 
the outcome of Appellant's appeal of the termination decision. [R. 212; 259]. 
28. On December 11, 2008, the Board heard Appellant's appeal contesting his 
termination by the City. [R. 230-234; 259]. 
29. During the appeal hearing, Appellant was represented by counsel. Both Appellant 
and the City offered witnesses and exhibits and had the right to cross-examine the 
other party's witnesses. [R. 230-234; 259]. 
1
 The City's Handbook distinguishes between "Informal Action" (verbal reprimand, 
corrective interviews, written reprimand) and "Formal Disciplinary Action" (suspension, 
without pay, reduction in salary, demotion, supplemental probation, dismissal, or any 
combination of the foregoing). 
In its decision issued on December 15, 2008, the Board made several findings of fact 
including the following: (1) Appellant incorrectly transmitted payroll information to 
the City's bank; (2) the payroll error caused significant problems for a number of City 
employees; (3) Appellant made two mistakes wiring funds to a bond trust fund that 
were in excess of 1.2 million dollars; (4) the wire transfers were part of a larger 
pattern of inattention to detail; (5) Appellant repeatedly wired wrong amounts for 
Roth IRAs; (6) Appellant incorrecdy entered water bill base rates which necessitated 
issuing refunds to water users; (7) Appellant was two months late making a bond 
payment; (8) Appellant failed to respond timely to voicemails and failed to attend 
scheduled meetings; (9) Appellant did not have the support and confidence of his co-
workers and supervisor; (10) Appellant was on constructive notice that his job 
performance was deficient based on his fellow employees numerous attempts to 
bring his shortcomings to his attention; (11) Appellant exercised a lackadaisical 
attitude toward his duties and failed to perform his job with the standard of care 
required in such a sensitive position; and (12) Appellant's job performance 
constituted a serious violation of City policy in terms of incompetence, inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, conduct causing discredit to the City and failure to meet expected 
performance levels such that termination was warranted. [R. 230-234; 259]. 
The Board also concluded as a matter of law (among other things) that Pedersen's 
decision to terminate Appellant was neither arbitrary or capricious, that there was 
substantial evidence (per Orem City Code § 2-26-12) to support Pedersen's decision, 
and that Appellant's performance constituted a serious violation of City policy in 
terms of incompetence, inefficiency, neglect of duty, conduct causing discredit to the 
City and failure to meet expected performance levels such that immediate termination 
was warranted. [R. 231]. 
32. Appellant filed a Complaint m the Fourth District Court on August 10, 2009. [R. 217]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court erroneously determined that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 required Appellant to file an appeal of the Board's decision with the 
Utah Court of Appeals and that his failure to do resulted in a failure to exhaust his 
administrative remedies. Appellant's position as Treasury Division Manager can arguable be 
deemed to be a "head of a department" or a "deputy of a head of department" position. 
Accordingly, Appellant was exempted under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2)(g)&(h) from 
the appeal requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. 
The trial court also erred in dismissing Appellant's "wrongful termination" claim. The 
trial court focused exclusively on the fact that Section 3 of the City's Handbook contained a 
provision disclaiming the creation of contractual obligations while ignoring the fact that 
relevant case law allows for the modification of the at-will employment status when an 
employment manual contains specific policies and procedures, and the employer fails to 
follow those policies and procedures. An implied contract may arise in such circumstances. 
w 
w 
w 
ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's claims on the basis that 
Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not 
appeal the Board's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals and instead filed in 
district court. 
A. Standard of Review. 
In reviewing a grant of a motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), an 
appellate court will review only the facts alleged in the complaint, accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 
779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989). Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nafl Bank, 161 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 
1988); Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). The reviewing court 
will affirm the dismissal only if it is apparent that as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not 
recover under the facts alleged. See Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat*I Bank, 767 P.2d at 936; 
Barms v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 205, 398 P.2d 207, 208 (1965); Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
Because the appellate court only considers the legal sufficiency of the complaint, the trial 
court's ruling is given no deference and is reviewed under a correctness standard. See Atlas 
Corp. v. Clovis Nat'lBank, 131 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 
716 (Utah 1985). 
B. The trial court preemptively and improperly determined that Appellant 
was not a a head of a municipal department" or a "deputy of a head of a 
municipal department" and was therefore required to appeal the 
Board's final decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court framed the legal issue of the exhaustion of 
Appellant's administrative remedies and the application of Utah's Municipal Code (Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-201 etseq.) as follows: Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2) specifically 
exempts from the hearing and appeal requirements in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 certain 
municipal employees including "a head of a municipal department" and "a deputy of a head 
of a municipal department." According to the trial court, the only material issue of law is 
related to the City's Handbook and whether the Handbook defines Appellant as a "head of a 
municipal department" or "a deputy head of a municipal department." [R. 346-347]. 
The trial court then analyzed the following definitions found in the Handbook [R. 
346]: 
(1) Department Director. "The individual designated as the administrative head of a 
department and designated as the Department Director for that department." 
{See Handbook, p. 115). [R. 60]. 
(2) Executive Management Employees: "Employees in classifications designated as 
Executive Management who are Department Directors and serve at the 
pleasure of the City Manager. These employees constitute the executive staff 
of the City and do not receive the grievance and appeals rights provided in these policies 
and procedures." {See Handbook, p. 116). [R. 59]. 
(3) Management Employees'. "Employees of the City who are filling management 
positions as determined by the City Manager." {See Handbook, p. 116). [R. 59]. 
The trial court noted that in Section 1 of the Handbook, City employees are classified 
as either "exempt" or "non-exempt" for purposes of coverage under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. {See Handbook, p. 33-35). [R. 140-142; 345]. In that classification section, the 
justifications for the exemptions are listed in the right column next to each position. There 
are four possible justifications: "management," "executive," "professional," and 
"administrative." 
The trial court posited that Pedersen's position (as "Administrative Services 
Director") is exempted as an "executive" position. Furthermore, most of the other 
"executive" positions include the term director in their tide. Appellant's position as 
"Treasury Division Manager" is exempted in Section 1 because it is "management" and not 
because it is "executive." 
The trial court relied upon the categorization of Appellant's position as 
"management" (and not "executive") in determining that Appellant was a "Management 
Employee" and not and "Executive Management Employee." The trial court further pointed 
out that Appellant's job title did not include the term "Department Director" or "Executive 
Management Employee." For this reason, the trial court ruled that as a "Management 
Employee," Appellant was subject to the grievance procedures outlined in the Handbook. 
[R. 345]. 
After establishing these definitional conclusions, the trial court then considered the 
relevant Municipal Code sections (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2) and § 10-3-1106). The 
trial court extrapolated that because Appellant did not "direct a department" (although he did 
have supervisory authority over other employees) and because nothing in his job title defined 
Appellant as a "deputy" to the head of a municipal department, Appellant did not fall under 
any of the categories of employees in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2) that are exempted 
from the appellate procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. 
The trial court reasoned that because Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6) indicates that a 
final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing 
with that court a petition for review within 30 days after issuance of the final action or order 
of the appeal board, and because Appellant did not file with the Court of Appeals (but 
rather, with the district court), Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and 
was precluded from seeking judicial review at the district court level. [R. 343-345]. 
The trial court's blanket conclusion that Appellant was not the "head of a 
department" or a "deputy of a head of a municipal department" [R. 344-345] is simply not 
supportable because the terms "head of a municipal department" and "deputy of a head of a 
municipal department" are not defined or utilized in the Handbook. 
The trial court suggests that, unlike the Appellant's position as Treasury Division 
Manager, the position of "Assistant City Manager" could be "argued as a 'deputy head of a 
municipal department' within the meaning of the Municipal Code."2 [R. 344]. The trial court 
does not explain how or why the position of "Assistant City Manager" might be considered 
a "deputy of a head of a municipal department." The trial court merely concludes that 
nothing in the Handbook supports an argument that Appellant was either a director or a 
deputy director and therefore excluded from the grievance process. [R. 344]. 
The problem with this generalization is that the statutory definitions found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2)(g)&(h) are not utilized in the Handbook. Certainly, it is an issue 
of fact whether a "Treasury Division Manager" could be deemed to be a "head of a 
municipal department."3 Appellant was manager of a division within the City's municipal 
2
 Technically, the trial court is mistaken in using the term "deputy head of a municipal 
department." The term used in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2) (h) is "a deputy of a head of a 
municipal department." (Emphasis added). 
3
 The trial court repeatedly equates "head of a municipal department" with "director," 
although there is nothing in the Handbook to support such an equation. 
offices and (as acknowledged by the trial court) supervised other employees. 
Moreover, it is entirely arguable that Appellant was a "deputy" of the City Manager or 
Assistant City Manager in undertaking his duties as the Treasury Division Manager. While 
Appellant's duties were undertaken in relation to the City's financial/treasury operations, 
Appellant was delegated certain authority to act on behalf of the City Manager and/or 
Assistant City Manager in that sphere. Because a "deputy" is generally defined as a person 
duly authorized by an officer to serve as his or her substitute by performing some or all of 
the officer's functions, Appellant could quite easily be considered a deputy of a head of a 
department.4 
The trial court should have allowed Appellant the full and fair opportunity to 
exonerate his position that he was either a "head of a municipal department" or a "deputy of 
a head of a municipal department" rather than relying upon vague inferences drawn from 
statutory terms that are not even included in the Handbook. If Appellant can establish that 
he functioned as either a head of a municipal department or as a deputy of a head of a 
municipal department, he would not be subject to the review requirements Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-3-1106, and accordingly, he was entided to file his Complaintwith the district court. 
Additionally, it is irrelevant that Appellant actually sought (and obtained) review of 
Pedersen's termination Notice in accordance with the Handbook's Section 3 procedures. 
Even if Appellant can be classified as a "Management Employee," and he was not exempted 
from the City's internal termination review procedure, it does not necessarily follow that he 
was subject to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. Furthermore, Appellant's 
4
 See any number of definitions of the word (e.g. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/deputy; 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deputy; http://www.dictionary.net/deputy). 
willingness to follow the internal appeals procedure outlined in the Handbook does not 
necessarily mean that he was legally obligated to do so because he was a "Management 
Employee" as opposed to an "Executive Management Employee." 
C. If Appellant was not subject to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106, he did not 
need to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing an appeal with the 
Utah Court of Appeals, and res judicata would not bar his Complaint 
before the district court. 
The trial court ruled that Appellant was required to appeal the Board's decision to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, and that by not doing so he failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies. The trial court also indicated that under the four-pronged analysis for determining 
the applicability of res judicata, all four prongs were met and Appellant's Complaint was barred. 
[R. 344]. Appellant contends on appeal that the fourth prong (final judgment on the merits) 
was not met insofar as the Board's decision was subject to appeal to the district court. 
Appellant also asserts that he exhausted his administrative remedy at the time the Board 
rendered its final decision upholding his termination. Because he was not required to appeal 
the final decision of the Board to the Utah Court of Appeals (inasmuch as Appellant asserts 
he was either "head of a department" or a "deputy of a head of a department" under Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and thus exempted from Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106), the 
Complaintwas properly filed with the district court. 
2. The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's claim for "wrongful 
termination" on the basis that the City's Handbook did not create an implied 
contract between the City and Appellant. 
A. Standard of Review. 
In reviewing a grant of a motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), an 
appellate court will review only the facts alleged in the complaint, accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 
779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989). Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Naf I Bank, 161 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 
1988); Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). The reviewing court 
will affirm the dismissal only if it is apparent that as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not 
recover under the facts alleged. Sec Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 161 P.2d at 936; 
Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 205, 398 P.2d 207, 208 (1965); Utah R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). 
Because the appellate court only considers the legal sufficiency of the complaint, the trial 
court's ruling is given no deference and is reviewed under a correctness standard. See Atlas 
Corp. v. ClovisNaflBank, 131 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 
716 (Utah 1985). 
B. The trial court ignored the fact that Appellant's "wrongful termination" 
claim was based upon allegations that Appellants did not follow their 
own internal policies and procedures. 
The trial court determined that under relevant Utah case law, Section 3 (Human 
Resource Policies and Procedures Manual) of the City's Handbook specifically disclaimed 
any contractual liability as to the human resources policy. Section 3 addresses performance 
evaluations, grievances and disciplinary action; however, due to the fact that Section 3 
contains a disclaimer negating the creation of any employment contract, Appellant could not 
legally claim that he had an implied contract with the City and sue for "wrongful 
termination." [R. 341]. 
The Utah Supreme Court provided guidance on the question of when an employee 
manual gives rise to an implied contract in Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 
1991). 
It is clear that the employee has the burden of establishing the existence of an 
implied-in-fact contract provision, that is, the employee must show that 
although there was no express contract provision to this effect, the parties 
nevertheless agreed that the employment would not be at will. If the parties 
actually intended such an agreement and the agreement is of such a nature that 
it is possible to operate as a contract term, a court will give effect to the 
parties' intentions by enforcing the agreement as an implied-in-fact contract 
provision. The existence of such an agreement is a question of fact 
which turns on the objective manifestations of the parties' intent. As a 
question of fact, the intent of the parties is primarily a jury question. 
However, if the evidence presented is such that no reasonable jury could 
conclude that the parties agreed to limit the employer's right to terminate the 
employee, it is appropriate for a court to decide the issue as a matter of law. 
(Internal citations omitted). (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 1001. 
Notwithstanding the fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry in determining the parties' 
intent, the Johnson Court found that the employee manual at issue contained "clear and 
conspicuous language disclaiming any contractual liability and stating [the employer's] intent 
to maintain an at-will relationship with its employees." Id. at 1004. The Johnson Court gave 
particular attention to the following language contained in the manual: 
This book is provided for general guidance only. The policies and procedures 
expressed in this book, as well as those in any other personnel materials which 
may be issued from time to time, do not create a binding contract or any other 
obligation or liability on the company. Your employment is for no set period 
and may be terminated without notice and at will at any time by you or the 
company. The company reserves the right to change these policies and 
procedures at any time for any reason. 
Id. at 1003. 
Because of the "clear and conspicuous" language of the disclaimer, the Johnson Court 
upheld the dismissal of the employee's implied contract claim. Nevertheless, the Johnson 
Court clearly distinguished between an employee who alleges that an employment handbook 
creates an implied contract requiring "good cause" for termination versus a claim that an 
employer has wrongfully terminated the employee in contravention of its own internal 
policies and procedures: 
Therefore, the procedures in the handbook for terminating an employee must 
be read in light of the language in the disclaimer which clearly reserved the 
right to discharge for any reason. Under such an approach, the most 
Johnson is entitled to is the right to challenge his termination under the 
handbook's procedures, not the right to be fired only for good cause. 
(Emphasis added). 
Wat 1003. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart expanded upon this concept by observing 
that: "[t]he law increasingly recognizes that informal understandings and usages may be 
implied into contracts." Id. at 1005. 
Justice Stewart further explained: 
In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that an employer's de facto policies 
may give rise to a contractually enforceable employee right to be discharged 
for just cause only, even in the presence of an employee policy manual 
statement to the contrary. Id at 600, 603, 92 S.Ct. at 2699, 2700. There are 
also federal and state court decisions which hold that course of conduct may 
negate the effect of written disclaimers designed to insulate employers from 
contractual liability. See, e.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1134-35 
(D.C.Cir.1969) (disclaimer asserting no contractual duty on the part of 
employer does not necessarily relieve employer of all obligations with respect 
to the observance of its regulations); Karl v. General Motors Corp,, 402 Mich. 
926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978) (reversed lower court's grant of summary 
judgment, remanded to consider employee claims regarding interpretation of 
employee handbook and reliance thereon, notwithstanding disclaimer 
purporting to limit any employer contractual obligations); Schipani v. Ford Motor 
Co., 102 Mich.App. 606, 612-14, 302 N.W.2d 307, 310-11 (1981) (rejected for 
other reasons in Kostello v. Rockwell Infl Corp., 189 Mich.App. 241, 472 N.W.2d 
71 (1991)) (under appropriate circumstances, oral promises may negate the 
effect of disclaimers which are intended to absolve employers from liability for 
policies presented in employee handbook). (Internal footnote omitted). 
This Court has held that "an employer's internally adopted policies and 
procedures concerning discharge can be sufficient evidence to rebut the 
presumption of at-will employment and can, in effect, become part of 
the contractual relationship between the employer and the employee" 
and that "[bjreach of the terms of this contractual relationship can result in 
damages determined as in any other breach of contract action." Caldwell v. 
Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989) (citing Berube, 
111 P.2d at 1044-46, 1050 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052-53 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result)). That principle may also have 
the effect of overcoming express assertions that a contract is at-will. 
(Emphasis added). 
Id. at 1005. 
Justice Stewart's ultimate point is that notwithstanding an employer's clear and 
conspicuous disclaimer of the creation of an implied contract between itself and an 
employee, the enactment of policies and procedures concerning termination or discharge by 
an employer can give rise to an implied contract between the employer and employee. In 
such circumstances, the employer has a contractual obligation to abide by its own policies 
and procedures. 
If the issue were whether there is a material issue of fact as to whether the 
declared at-will relationship had been modified in any way at all by implied 
terms arising from Thiokol's conduct and the other terms in the manual, there 
would be a material issue of fact, because Thiokol has indicated in its manual 
and in practice that it terminates employees only after certain procedures are 
followed. The employee handbook contains a detailed program setting forth 
specific rules of conduct, procedures for disciplinary actions, including 
discharge, and procedures for employee grievances. The handbook also sets 
forth types of conduct for which disciplinary action would or could be 
imposed and the possible consequences. Thiokol in fact followed those 
procedures in the past with respect to plaintiff and in the instant case by 
complying with the extensive grievance procedures set forth in the manual. 
Thus, there is clear evidence of an implied-in-fact contract term with respect 
to procedures to be followed when an employee is disciplined or discharged. 
The statement of these procedures in Thiokol's manual and their 
implementation clearly could remove the employment relationship from a 
strict at-will relationship. To that extent, a jury certainly could find that the at-
will relationship had been modified, notwithstanding the manual's statement 
that employment was on an at-will basis. 
Id. at 1006. 
When the Johnson opinion is read in toto, it is clear that the Court upheld dismissal of 
the Johnson's claim because he alleged that he could not be terminated without "just cause" 
rather than that his employer failed to follow its own policies and procedures as outlined in 
the employment manual. Id. at 1003-1004, 1006. The Court recognized the possibility that a 
claim for violation of internal policies and procedures by an employer could lie (or at least 
present triable issues of fact) even where an employer has disclaimed the formation of an 
employment contract through clear and conspicuous language. 
The Johnson Court did not hold that an employee manual could never give rise to an 
implied contract, but rather held that the existence of an implied employment agreement is a 
question of fact that turns on the objective manifestation of the parties' intent. The employer's 
intent and the terms of the employment relationship can be partially ascertained through the 
policies and procedures established in the employment manual for employee termination are 
legitimate sources for determining the apparent intentions of the parties and for fixing the 
terms of the employment relationship. Id. at 1000. 
The trial court in the instant case focused exclusively on the fact that Section 3 
(Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual) of the City's Handbook contained "clear 
and conspicuous" disclaimer language.5 [R. 340-341]. The trial court correctly pointed out 
that the opening paragraph of Section 3 indicates: "[njothing in this manual implies or is part 
of an employment contract." [R. 51; 341]. According to the trial court, because Section 3 
addresses performance evaluations, grievances, disciplinary action, termination and appeals 
processes and because it is these procedures and policies that formed the basis for 
Appellant's wrongful termination claim, there could be no implied contract (as a result of the 
general disclaimer), and thus, Appellant's wrongful termination claim must fail as a matter of 
law. [R. 340]. 
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court entirely failed to recognize or address the 
fact that Appellant's wrongful termination claim was based wholly on allegations that 
Appellees failed to follow their own policies and procedures. In the initial Complaint, 
Appellant specifically alleged the following inconsistencies in Appellees' actions vis-a-vis the 
Handbook: 
(1) The City promoted Appellant to the position of City Treasurer according to 
the Handbook's promotion guidelines in May 2006. [R. 54; 214]. 
(2) From May 2006 to March 2008, Appellant received above-satisfactory scores 
on his performance evaluations. [The evaluations were attached as Exhibit " 1 " 
to the Complaint and are included at R. 180-207. See also R. 214]. 
(3) Plaintiffs first indication that there was an issue with his performance 
occurred on or about September 6, 2008. [R. 214]. 
5
 The trial court admitted that only Section 3 of the Handbook contains such a disclaimer 
and that Sections 1, 2, and 4 contain no such disclaimer. [R. 341]. 
(4) Appellant addressed and remedied any performance deficiency as soon as he 
was advised by Appellees. [R. 214]. 
(5) Appellant first received notice of concerns about his performance on 
September 6, 2008. Plaintiff had no real opportunity to improve his 
performance and the City took no intermediate disciplinary action prior to his 
prompt termination on September 24, 2008. [R. 213]. 
(6) During and between September 6, 2008 and his termination two weeks later, 
Appellant was provided no additional training and no additional guidelines on 
how to improve his performance. [R. 213]. 
(7) Appellees terminated Appellant in violation of Appellee's own established 
policies. [R. 213]. 
(8) Appellees terminated Appellant without proper notice and procedure. [R.213]. 
(9) According to the "Disciplinary Procedures" outlined in the Handbook on 
pages 131 through 141 [R. 34-44], there are a number of informal and formal 
disciplinary actions that may be taken prior termination. [R. 215]. 
(10) Specifically, on page 131 under "Disciplinary Procedure," Policy 2 provides: 
"Disciplinary actions shall be limited in severity commensurate with the 
infraction(s) in question and/or past infractions." [R. 44; 215]. 
(11) Policy 5 on page 132 indicates: "Nothing contained in these Policies and 
Procedures shall preclude dismissal. . . without prior notice and a hearing 
where the continued presence of the employee would present a hazard or 
disruption to employees, the public, or the City." [R. 43; 215]. 
(12) Neither Pedersen's Notice nor anything in the record on appeal before the 
Board contains an assertion that Appellant's continued presence would have 
presented "a hazard or disruption to employees, the public, or the City." [R. 
215]. 
(13) Appellant specifically explained in his September 24, 2008 appeal letter that 
the mistakes referred to in the Notice were made over a two-week period and 
that he had provided exceptional service as an employee of the City for 28 
years. [R. 174]. Appellant also noted that he had never received training and 
was unaware of certain mistakes that he had made because he was never 
notified of them and given a chance to correct them. [R. 174]. 
Appellant contends that despite the City's statement in its employee manual that 
"[n]othing in this manual implies or is part of an employment contract," the balance of the 
Handbook (which provides specific guidelines by which employees will be terminated, the 
City's policies and procedures, and the City's actions regarding other similarly situated 
employees) creates an implied contract with respect to those policies and procedures, and 
that Appellant was entitied to rely on such policies and procedures. 
Plaintiff further contends that the Johnson decision requires clear and conspicuous 
language that both:(l) disclaims contractual liability, and (2) establishes an at-will 
employment relationship. Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1003. The relevant disclaimer provision in 
Johnson contained both a disclaimer of contractual obligation and a clear statement that 
employment was for "no set period and may be terminated at will." The provision in Section 
3 of the City's Handbook disclaims the creation of an employment contract but does not 
designate employees as "at will." 
The trial court narrowly focused on the "clear and conspicuous" language of the 
Johnson ruling while ignoring language that contemplates the viability of a claim based on 
allegations that an employer failed to follow its own internal policies and procedures. Taking 
the facts asserted in Appellant's Complaint and Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss in the light most favorable to Appellant, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
dismissal of Appellant's claim for wrongful termination. Appellant has articulated facts 
sufficient to raise a triable issue on the claim for wrongful termination. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above-state reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the trial court's dismissal of those claims outlined herein. 
Respectfully submitted this If l day of December 2010. 
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ADDENDUM " 1 " 
(Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 
1991)) 
Westlaw, 
818 P.2d 997, 124 Lab.Cas. P 57,309, 10IER Cases 1871 
(Cite as: 818 P.2d 997) 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Billy JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
MORTON THIOKOL, INC., Defendant and Appel-
lee. 
No. 890315. 
Sept. 5, 1991. 
Employee brought action against former employer to 
recover damages resulting from involuntary termina-
tion of his employment. The First District Court, Box 
Elder County, Franklin L. Gunnell, J., entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of employer, and employee 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that 
neither handbook setting forth termination procedures 
nor employer's compliance with those procedures 
created implied-in-fact contract modifying at-will 
employment relationship, where handbook contained 
clear and conspicuous language disclaiming any con-
tractual liability and stating employer's intent to 
maintain at-will relationship with employees. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., filed separate opinion concurring in re-
sult, in which Durham, J., concurred. 
West Headnotes 
HI Appeal and Error 30 €==>863 
30 Appeal and Error 
3QXVI Review 
30XVKA) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on 
Nature of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 €=>934(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKG) Presumptions 
Page 1 
30k934 Judgment 
30k934(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
When reviewing order granting summary judgment, 
evidence and all inferences that may be reasonably 
drawn from evidence must be liberally construed in 
favor of party opposing motion; determination of 
whether, given this view of evidence, moving party is 
entitled to judgment is question of law, which is re-
viewed for correctness. 
121 Labor and Employment 231H €==>40(2) 
231H Labor and Employment 
231HI In General 
231Hk37 Term, Duration, and Termination 
231Hk40 Definite or Indefinite Term; Em-
ployment At-Will 
231Hk40(2) k. Termination; Cause or 
Reason in General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k20 Master and Servant) 
Employee hired for indefinite period is presumed to 
be employee at will who can be terminated for any 
reason whatsoever so long as termination does not 
violate state or federal statute. 
131 Labor and Employment 231H €^>759 
231H Labor and Employment 
231HV11I Adverse Employment Action 
231HV11KA) In General 
231Hk759 k. Public Policy Considerations 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k30(1.10) Master and Servant) 
Existence and scope of public policy exception to at-
will doctrine have yet to be clearly established in 
Utah. 
HI Labor and Employment 231H €^=>50 
231H Labor and Employment 
231H1 In General 
231Hk49 Manuals, Handbooks, and Policy 
Statements 
231Hk50 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant) 
Terms of employee manual can operate as implied-
818 P.2d 997,124 Lab.Cas. P 57,309, 10IER Cases 1871 
(Cite as: 818 P.2d 997) 
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in-fact contract terms rebutting presumption of at-
will employment and fixing terms of employee rela-
tionship, and continued performance of employee's 
duties is adequate consideration for such implied 
contract provision; it is not necessary to show express 
or implied stipulation as to duration of employment 
or consideration beyond rendering of services under 
employment contract. 
151 Labor and Employment 231H C^>55 
231H Labor and Employment 
231 HI In General 
231Hk53 Evidence of Employment 
231Hk55 k. Presumptions and Burden of 
Proof. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k40(l) Master and Servant) 
Employee has burden of establishing existence of 
implied-in-fact contract provision, that is, employee 
must show that although there was no express con-
tract provision to this effect, parties nevertheless 
agreed that employment would not be at will. 
161 Labor and Employment 231H €=>36 
231H Labor and Employment 
231HI In General 
231Hk31 Contracts 
231Hk36 k. Implied Contracts. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant) 
If parties actually intended implied-in-fact employ-
ment agreement and agreement is of such nature that 
it is possible to operate as contract term, court will 
give effect to parties' intention by enforcing agree-
ment as implied-in-fact contract provision. 
121 Labor and Employment 231H €=>58 
231H Labor and Employment 
231HI In General 
231Hk58 k. Questions of Law and Fact as to 
Employment Status. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k43 Master and Servant) 
Existence of implied-in-fact employment agreement 
is question of fact which turns on objective manifes-
tation of parties' intent; however, if evidence pre-
sented is such that no reasonable jury could conclude 
that parties agreed to limit employer's right to termi-
nate employee, it is appropriate for court to decide 
issue as matter of law. 
181 Labor and Employment 231H €==>36 
231H Labor and Employment 
231HI In General 
231Hk31 Contracts 
231Hk36 k. Implied Contracts. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant) 
For implied-in-fact contract term to exist in employ-
ment context, it must meet requirements for offer of 
unilateral contract; there must be manifestation of 
employer's intent that is communicated to employee 
and sufficiently definite to operate as contract provi-
sion, and manifestation of employer's intent must be 
of such nature that employee can reasonably believe 
that employer is making offer of employment other 
than employment at will. 
121 Labor and Employment 231H € ^ 3 6 
231H Labor and Employment 
231 HI In General 
231Hk31 Contracts 
231Hk36 k. Implied Contracts. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant) 
While exact parameters concerning nature of evi-
dence jury may properly consider to arrive at parties' 
intent and to fix terms of employment relationship, 
for purposes of implied-in-fact contract term, have 
yet to be determined, it is clear that evidence must be 
sufficient to fulfill requirements of unilateral offer. 
HOI Labor and Employment 231H €=>51 
231H Labor and Employment 
231HI In General 
231Hk49 Manuals, Handbooks, and Policy 
Statements 
231Hk51 k. Particular Cases. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant) 
Procedures set forth in employee handbook for ter-
minating employee did not create implied-in-fact 
contract for employment other than employment at 
will, where handbook contained clear and conspicu-
ous language disclaiming any contractual liability 
and stating employer's intent to maintain at-will rela-
818P.2d997,124 Lab.Cas. P 57,309, 10 IER Cases 1871 
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tionship with employees. 
[Ill Labor and Employment 231H €==>51 
231H Labor and Employment 
231 HI In General 
231Hk49 Manuals, Handbooks, and Policy 
Statements 
231Hk51 k. Particular Cases. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 255k7 Master and Servant) 
Employee's compliance with handbook procedures 
during employee's annual appraisals and his termina-
tion did not create implied-in-fact contract modifying 
at-will employment relationship established upon 
distribution of handbook, where handbook contained 
clear and conspicuous language disclaiming any con-
tractual liability and stating employer's intent to 
maintain at-will relationship with employees. 
*998 Philip C. Patterson, Ogden, for Johnson. 
Mary Anne Q. Wood, Salt Lake City, for Morton 
Thiokol Co. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Billy Johnson sought to recover damages 
resulting from the involuntary termination of his em-
ployment. From an entry of summary judgment in 
favor of defendant Morton Thiokol, Inc. ("Thiokol"), 
Johnson appeals. When reviewing an order granting 
summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable in-
ferences that can be drawn from the facts are viewed 
in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion FNl 
FN1. Cidp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall 
795 P.2d 650. 651 (Utah 1990). 
Johnson was hired by Thiokol on February 12, 1979, 
as a process inspector and was continuously em-
ployed at Thiokol until the date of his termination, 
July 20, 1988. At no time during his employment did 
he enter into an express contract with Thiokol which 
restricted Thiokol's ability to terminate his employ-
ment. Throughout Johnson's tenure, Thiokol pub-
lished and distributed an employee handbook. The 
text of the handbook contains several pages prescrib-
ing Thiokol's policy concerning employee discipli-
nary, appraisal, and grievance procedures.1^2 In ad-
ministering Johnson's*999 nine employee appraisals, 
Thiokol complied with the procedures set out in the 
handbook. However, the introduction of the hand-
book contains clear and conspicuous language stating 
that the provisions of the manual are not intended to 
operate as terms of an employment contract. 
FN2. The handbook provides in part: 
GENERAL POLICY 
It is the policy of Morton Thiokol, Inc., to 
establish reasonable rules of employment 
conduct and to ensure compliance with 
these rules through a program consistent 
with the best interests of the Company and 
its employees. 
Violation of rules of conduct may result in 
one of the following forms of corrective 
discipline: 
• Employee Discussion 
• Notice of Caution 
• Involuntary suspension without pay, not 
to exceed five days 
• Termination 
To assure uniform treatment of all em-
ployees, Employee Relations must ap-
prove all cases of notice of caution, sus-
pension, or termination prior to imple-
mentation. Individual supervisors are re-
sponsible for recommending disciplinary 
action, but ultimate authority with the re-
spect to discipline rests with the appropri-
ate vice president for any given case. 
CATEGORIES OF RULE INFRAC-
TIONS 
• Category 1-Infractions that may result in 
an Employee Discussion or Notice of 
Caution. Termination or suspension can 
occur under Category 1, if the severity of 
the violation warrants such action. 
818 P.2d 997,124 Lab.Cas. P 57,309, 10 1ER Cases 1871 
(Cite as: 818 P.2d 997) 
Page 4 
• Category 2-Infractions that will result in 
a Notice of Caution and could result in 
disciplinary suspension or termination. 
Some rules of conduct may apply to either 
category. A supervisor's determination of 
the category for which discipline is rec-
ommended will include consideration of 
the seriousness of the violation, the em-
ployee's past record, and extenuating cir-
cumstances. Suspension without pay, for 
up to five working days, may be applied if 
warranted in connection with Notices of 
Caution. 
Two Notices of Caution for the same of-
fense, or a total of four Notices of Caution 
for any combination of offenses, within a 
two-year period, may result in involuntary 
termination. 
Notices of Caution become void after two 
years, and Human Resources is responsi-
ble for purging the official personnel files. 
PROMOTIONS 
CREASES 
AND PAY IN-
Like most people, you are probably look-
ing forward to increased responsibility 
and promotion, and Morton Thiokol rec-
ognizes this as a natural and worthy de-
sire. 
termination, Johnson and all members of the inspec-
tion crews worked mandatory overtime in order to 
meet Air Force-imposed deadlines. In connection 
with these deadlines, the inspectors were urged by 
upper management to avoid shut-down orders be-
cause such orders would result in unacceptable 
scheduling pressure. 
When Johnson arrived at work on July 8, 1988, the 
technicians were involved in setting up five simulta-
neous operations. It had become common practice to 
perform numerous operations simultaneously even 
though there was only one inspector assigned to the 
building. An inspector was required to witness each 
operation, but due to the simultaneous "setups," it 
was impossible for one inspector to observe each 
procedure. Johnson therefore prioritized those areas 
where actual observations were made. At one point, 
he was notified that a setup had been completed. He 
glanced at the setup but did not complete the thirty-
nine-step breakdown required to verify the procedure. 
However, he verified that he had completed the ap-
propriate inspection. Due to the inadequate inspec-
tion, Johnson failed to notice that certain hoses had 
been improperly installed. 
The next day, during a routine test operation, excess 
pressure caused by the improperly installed hoses 
forced the O-rings out of their groove and damaged 
some insulation lining on the motor. The damage 
required that the test motor be disassembled to make 
repairs, causing a twenty-day delay in the test firing 
of the rocket motor. The incident resulted in an inves-
tigation by NASA officials and was highly publicized 
in both the local and national news media. Johnson 
and the employee who installed the hoses were ter-
minated. 
Performance evaluations provide a guide 
for improvement of your work and a basis 
for your promotions and merit increases in 
pay. 
In the beginning of July 1988, Thiokol implemented 
a leak check test procedure for verifying the proper 
placement and seal of Thiokol's redesigned O-rings, 
which are used in space shuttle rocket motors. John-
son, although he had not received adequate training 
regarding the new process, was assigned to inspect 
the leak check test procedure. For the three weeks 
prior to the date of the incident which resulted in his 
Johnson was terminated pursuant to the procedures 
set out in the employee handbook. After his termina-
tion, he initiated grievance procedures which were 
also conducted in accordance with the handbook. The 
grievance was denied on the ground that Johnson was 
terminated for "careless or inefficient performance of 
duty," a ground which, according to the handbook, 
can result in termination. 
On February 22, 1989, Johnson commenced this ac-
tion, claiming that Thiokol, by terminating his em-
ployment without good cause, breached an implied-
in-fact contract provision. Thiokol filed a motion to 
818 P 2d 997, 124 Lab Cas P 57,309, 10 IER Cases 1871 
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dismiss pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) At the hearing, the motion was treated as a 
motion for summary judgment under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56 The trial court dismissed John-
son's case on the grounds that no implied-in-fact con-
tract existed between Johnson and Thiokol and, alter-
natively, that Johnson was fired for good cause 
Johnson appeals from these rulings 
[11 Summary judgment is proper when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment*1000 as a matter of law E M 
Therefore, when reviewing an order granting sum-
mary judgment, the evidence and all inferences that 
may be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be 
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the 
motion — The determination of whether, given this 
view of the evidence, the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment is a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness — The first issue presented on appeal, 
therefore, is whether the trial court erred in ruling 
that there was no implied contract provision limiting 
Thiokol's ability to terminate Johnson If the trial 
court was correct in this ruling, it will not be neces-
sary to reach the second issue, whether Johnson was 
fired for cause 
FN3 Utah R Civ P 56(c), see, eg Clove) 
v Snowhnd, 808 P 2d 1037. 1039 (Utah 
1991), Utah State Coalition of Senior Citi-
zens x Utah Powei & Light Co , 776 P 2d 
632, 634 (Utah 1989) 
FN4 See, e g, Copper State Leasing Co x 
Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co, 770 
P2d 88 89 (Utah 1988). Payne v Mxers. 
743 P 2d 186, 187-88 (Utah 1987) 
FN5 See, e g, Blue Cross & Blue Shield x 
State of Utah, 779 P 2d 634, 636 (Utah 
1989), Bonham v Moigan, 788 P 2d 497. 
499 (Utah 1989) 
[2][3][4] Johnson argues that although he did not 
have an express contract with Thiokol and was hired 
for an indefinite term, he is entitled to damages re-
sulting from the termination of his employment under 
our recent case of Berube v Fashion Centre, Ltd~ 
Berube modified Utah's position on the doctrine of 
employment at will In Utah, an employee hired for 
an indefinite period is presumed to be an employee at 
will who can be terminated for any reason whatso-
ever so long as the termination does not violate a 
state or federal statute — Prior to Berube, in order 
for indefinite-term employees to establish that their 
employment was not at will, it was necessary to show 
an express or implied stipulation as to the duration of 
the employment or consideration beyond the render-
ing of services under the employment contract — 
Berube modified this position by holding that the 
terms of an employee manual can operate as lmphed-
m-fact contract terms rebutting the presumption of at-
will employment and fixing the terms of the em-
ployee relationship — In addition, *1001 Berube 
established that the continued performance of the 
employee's duties is adequate consideration for such 
an implied contract provisionkM1 
FN6 771 P 2d 1033 (Utah 1989) 
FN7 Rosex Allied Dex Co, 719 P 2d 83, 
84-85 (Utah 1986) There are state and fed-
eral statutes that limit an employer's ability 
to terminate employees on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and 
handicap See, eg, Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U S C fr2QQ0e-2(a)(l), Utah Code 
Ann fr 34-35-6 
There is dictum in Berube and in Hodges 
v Gibson Products Co, 811 P2d 151 
(Utah 1991), suggesting that Justices Dur-
ham, Stewart, and Zimmerman would 
recognize a public policy exception to the 
at-will doctrine See Beiuhe, 111 P 2d at 
1042-43 (Durham, J , joined by Stewart, 
J ), at 1051 (Zimmerman, J , concurring in 
the result), Hodges, 811 P 2d at 165-68 
(Stewart, J , joined by Durham, J ) , at 168 
(Zimmerman, J , concurring in the result, 
joined by Hall, C J ) Such an exception 
would prevent employers from terminat-
ing employees for reasons that violate 
public policy However, these justices do 
not agree on the nature of such an excep-
tion See Berube, 111 P 2d at 1042-43 
(Durham, J , joined by Stewart, J ) , at 
1051 (Zimmerman, J , concurring m the 
result), Hodges, 811 P2d at 165-68 
(Stewart, J , joined by Durham, J) , at 168 
(Zimmerman, J , concurring in the result, 
joined by Hall, C J ) In any event, the 
818 P.2d 997,124 Lab.Cas. P 57,309, 10IER Cases 1871 
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public policy exception has yet to be 
clearly established in Utah. 
FN8. Rose. 719 P.2d at 85; Bihlmaier v. 
Carson. 603 P.2d 790. 792 (Utah 1979). 
FN9. Berube is a plurality opinion. How-
ever, the opinions of Justices Durham and 
Zimmerman establish that an employee 
manual can rebut the presumption of at-will 
employment by showing the existence of an 
implied-in-fact contract term providing that 
the employment is not at will. Beruhe, 111 
P.2d at 1044-46, 1048 (Durham, J., joined 
by Stewart, J.), at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result); see also Brehany v. 
Nordstrom. Inc.. 812 P.2d 49. 54 (Utah 
1991) (discussing Berube's holding). 
The lead opinion in Berube, written by 
Justice Durham and joined by Justice 
Stewart, discussed three exceptions to the 
at-will employment doctrine, the public 
policy exception, the implied contract ex-
ception, and an exception based on the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. See Berube. Ill P.2d at 1042-47. 
The decision, however, was based on the 
theory that the presumption of at-will em-
ployment may be rebutted by implied con-
tract terms. See Berube. Ill P.2d at 1049-
50. All five justices agreed that an implied 
contract provision may rebut the presump-
tion of employment at will, Berube, 111 
P.2d at 1044-46 (Durham, J., joined by 
Stewart, J.), at 1050 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., 
concurring, joined by Hall, C.J.), at 1052-
53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the re-
sult), although there was not complete 
agreement on the nature of such a claim. 
See Berube. Ill P.2d at 1052-53 (Zim-
merman, J., concurring in the result). 
Johnson's appeal is limited to an implied-
in-fact contract claim. 
FN 10. Berube. Ill P.2d at 1044-46, 1048 
(Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052-
53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the re-
sult); see also Brehanv, 812 P.2d at 54. 
[51f6][7] There are issues concerning the implied-in-
fact employee contracts recognized in Berube that 
have yet to be addressed. However, Berube and its 
progeny have established several principles regarding 
these relationships. It is clear that the employee has 
the burden of establishing the existence of an im-
plied-in-fact contract provision, f M i that is, the em-
ployee must show that although there was no express 
contract provision to this effect, the parties neverthe-
less agreed that the employment would not be at 
wjH FKil jf t^e parties actually intended such an 
agreement and the agreement is of such a nature that 
it is possible to operate as a contract term, a court 
will give effect to the parties' intentions by enforcing 
the agreement as an implied-in-fact contract provi-
s j o n thil Yke existence of such an agreement is a 
question of fact which turns on the objective manifes-
tations of the parties' intent.*1^ As a question of fact, 
the intent of the parties is primarily a jury ques-
tion.11^ However, if the evidence presented is such 
that no reasonable jury could conclude that the par-
ties agreed to limit the employer's right to terminate 
the employee, it is appropriate for a court to decide 
the issue as a matter of law.m1^ 
FN 11. Berube. Ill P.2d at 1044 (Durham, 
J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052 (Zimmer-
man, J., concurring in the result). 
FN 12. Bembe. Ill P.2d at 1044 (Durham, 
J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052 (Zimmer-
man, J., concurring in the result); see 
Quality Performance Lines v. Yoho Automo-
tive. 609 P.2d 1340. 1341 (Utah 1980). 
FN13. Berube. Ill P.2d at 1044 (Durham, 
J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052 (Zimmer-
man, J., concurring in the result); see 
Quality Performance Lines, 609 P.2d at 
1341-42. 
FN 14. Bembe. Ill P.2d at 1044 (Durham, 
J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052 (Zimmer-
man, J., concurring in the result); Quality 
Performance Lines. 609 P.2d at 1341; Pine 
River State Bank v. Mettille. 333 N.W.2d 
622. 626 (Minn. 1983). 
FN15. Brehany. 812 P.2d at 57: Caldwell v. 
Ford. Bacon & Davis Utah. Inc.. Ill P.2d 
483. 487 (Utah 1989): Berube. Ill P.2d at 
1044 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 
818 P 2d 997,124 Lab Cas P 57,309, 10IER Cases 1871 
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1052 (Zimmerman, J , concurring m the re-
sult) 
While the existence of an agreement 
which forms the basis of an lmphed-m-
fact contract provision is a question of 
fact, not all issues relating to implied em-
ployment contract provisions are factual 
questions Indeed, we have held that when 
terms of an employee manual constitute 
an employment contract, the proper inter-
pretation of the unambiguous terms of the 
manual is an issue for the court Caldwell 
111 P 2d at 485-86 If it is determined that 
an agreement exists between an employee 
and an employer, the same legal question 
(I e , interpretation of unambiguous terms) 
and the same factual questions (l e , inter-
pretation of ambiguous terms) may arise 
under the implied contract as may arise 
under any agreement that is alleged to 
form an express contract Therefore, in 
some situations it is appropriate to uphold 
a grant of summary judgment on a legal 
question that arises under the alleged con-
tract Id 
FN 16 See Clover v Snow bud. 808 P 2d at 
1040, Birkner v Salt Lake County, 771 P 2d 
1053. 1057 (Utah 1989) (both cases hold 
that court may decide factual questions 
where reasonable minds cannot differ) See 
generally Loose v Nature-All Corp, 785 
P2d 1096. 1098 (Utah 1989) (court re-
viewed trial court finding of fact concerning 
existence of lmplied-in-fact agreement for 
substantial evidence) 
[8] We have also addressed the nature of indefinite-
term employment relationships with implied-in-fact 
contract provisions which limit an employer's right to 
terminate an employee In Brehany v Nordstrom, 
Inc, we stated that if an employee manual is to be 
considered part of an employment contract, the terms 
should be considered terms of a unilateral contract 
— Several jurisdictions have taken such an ap-
p r o a c h 0 ^ Under a unilateral contract *1002 analy-
sis, an employer's promise of employment under cer-
tain terms and for an indefinite period constitutes 
both the terms of the employment contract and the 
employer's consideration for the employment con-
tract The employee's performance of service pursu-
ant to the employer's offer constitutes both the em-
ployee's acceptance of the offer and the employee's 
consideration for the contractm15 Therefore, for an 
implied-in-fact contract term to exist, it must meet 
the requirements for an offer of a unilateral contract 
There must be a manifestation of the employer's in-
tent that is communicated to the employee ^ ^ and 
sufficiently definite to operate as a contract provi-
sion E^21 Furthermore, the manifestation of the em-
ployer's intent must be of such a nature that the em-
ployee can reasonably believe that the employer is 
making an offer of employment other than employ-
ment at will ^ ^ The unilateral nature of such an em-
ployment contract is important because it affects the 
flexibility of the employment relationship 
FN17 Brehanv. 812 P 2d at 56 n 2 Bre-
hany involved an implied contract provision 
limiting an employer's right to terminate an 
indefinite-term employee A unilateral con-
tract analysis may not be applicable where it 
is alleged that an implied-in-fact contract ex-
ists, creating employment for a definite pe-
riod 
FN 18 Eg, Brooks v Trans World Airlines, 
Inc . 574 F Supp 805. 809 (D Colo 1983). 
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc v Campbell, 512 
So 2d 725. 731 (Ala 1987). Pine Rner State 
Bank 333 N W 2d at 626-27 
FN19 See 1 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 
21 (1963), see also supra note 17 
FN2Q See supra note 17 
FN21 See Restatement (Second) of Con-
tacts § 33 (1979) (must be certain enough to 
determine existence of breach and appropri-
ate remedy), see also Pme Rivei State Bank 
333 N W 2d at 626 
FN22 See supra note 17, see also, e g, Doe 
v First Natl Bank of Chicago, 865 F 2d 
864. 873 (7th Cir 1989) (applying Illinois 
law), Leikvold v Valley View Community 
Hosv, 141 Ariz 544. 688 P2d 170. 174 
(1984). Hoffman-La Roche, Inc . 512 So 2d 
at 734. Noik v Fettet Printing Co, 738 
S W 2d 824. 827 (Kv Ct ADD 1987). Bailey 
818 P.2d 997, 124 Lab.Cas. P 57,309, 10IER Cases 1871 
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v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 
120. 121-23 (N.D.1986). 
In the case of unilateral contract for employment, 
where an at-will employee retains employment 
with knowledge of new or changed conditions, the 
new or changed conditions may become a contrac-
tual obligation. In this manner, an original em-
ployment contract may be modified or replaced by 
a subsequent unilateral contract. The employee's 
retention of employment constitutes acceptance of 
the offer of a unilateral contract; by continuing to 
stay on the job, although free to leave, the em-
ployment supplies the necessary consideration for 
FN23. Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 
627. 
Indeed, such an approach is consistent with our case 
law decided prior to Brehany where we have held 
that the terms of an employee manual may constitute 
terms of an employment contract even when the em-
ployees do not receive the manual until after they are 
hired.1^ 
FN24. Caldwell 111 P.2d at 485. 
[9] However, it is not clear what type of evidence is 
sufficient to raise a triable issue concerning the inten-
tions of the parties and therefore the existence of an 
implied-in-fact contract term. In cases where we have 
held that there is a triable issue regarding the exis-
tence of such a term, we have based our decision 
upon express statements of the employer. Specifi-
cally, we have held that employee manuals and bulle-
tins containing policies for employee termination are 
legitimate sources for determining the apparent inten-
tions of the parties and for fixing the terms of the 
employment relationship.1^ However, we have not 
seen fit to limit the evidence concerning the parties' 
intent to such situations. Though the exact parameters 
concerning the nature of the evidence a jury may 
properly consider to arrive at the parties' intent and to 
fix the terms of the employee relationship are yet to 
be determined, it is clear that the evidence must be 
sufficient to fulfill the requirements of a unilateral 
offer. 
FN25. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 57: Caldwell 
111 P.2d at 485-86: Berube, 111 P.2d at 
1Q44_46% 1Q48 (Durham, J., joined by Stew-
art, J.), at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concur-
ring in the result). 
[10"1|T1] Applying these principles to the instant case, 
it is clear that the trial judge was correct in ruling as a 
matter of law that no implied contract provision ex-
isted limiting Thiokol's right to terminate John-
son.* 1003 Johnson's allegations are insufficient to 
create a triable issue concerning whether Johnson 
could reasonably believe that Thiokol intended to 
modify the employment relationship to provide that 
an employee could be terminated only for good 
cause. This can be seen by examining the specific 
allegations upon which Johnson bases his claim. 
Johnson argues that an implied-in-fact contract term 
providing that he should be terminated only for good 
cause is evidenced by the procedures set out in the 
handbook for appraisals, discipline, and grievances; 
the administration of its annual employee perform-
ance evaluation program; Johnson's and Thiokol's 
joint use of the grievance procedures; and Thiokol's 
stated good cause reason for terminating Johnson. 
It is to be observed that Johnson's reliance on the 
terms of the employee handbook is misplaced. We 
have held that the terms of employee manuals may 
raise triable issues concerning the existence of an 
implied-in-fact contract. ^ ^ However, the manual 
presently at issue contains clear and conspicuous lan-
guage disclaiming any contractual liability and stat-
ing Thiokol's intent to maintain an at-will relationship 
with its employees: 
FN26. Brehanw 812 P.2d at 56-57: 
Caldwell 111 P.2d at 485-86; Berube. 11 \ 
R2d at 1044-46, 1048 (Durham, J., joined 
by Stewart, J.), at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result). 
This book is provided for general guidance only. 
The policies and procedures expressed in this book, 
as well as those in any other personnel materials 
which may be issued from time to time, do not cre-
ate a binding contract or any other obligation or li-
ability on the company. Your employment is for no 
set period and may be terminated without notice 
and at will at any time by you or the company. The 
company reserves the right to change these policies 
and procedures at any time for any reason. 
Given this language, the only reasonable conclu-
818 P 2d 997, 124 Lab Cas P 57,309, 10 IER Cases 1871 
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sion an employee or a juror could reach concerning 
Thiokol's intention is that Thiokol intended to re-
tain the right to discharge for any reason Treating 
the handbook as part of the employment contract, 
traditional rules of contract interpretation would 
require us to read the handbook as a whole, harmo-
nizing all of the provisions m 2 Z Therefore, the pro-
cedures in the handbook for terminating an em-
ployee must be read in light of the language in the 
disclaimer which clearly reserved the right to dis-
charge for any reason Under such an approach, the 
most Johnson is entitled to is the right to challenge 
his termination under the handbook's procedures, 
not the right to be fired only for good cause We 
also note that a number of jurisdictions have held 
that a clear and conspicuous disclaimer, as a matter 
of law, prevents employee manuals or other like 
material from being considered as implied-in-fact 
contract terms 
E1SP8 
FN27 LPS Hosp v Capitol Life Ins. 765 
P2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988), see also 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts fr 202(2) 
(1979) (a writing should be interpreted as a 
whole) 
FN28 The following cases have held as a 
matter of law that a clear and conspicuous 
disclaimer prevents the terms of an em-
ployee manual from being considered terms 
of an employment contract Eg, Doe v 
First Nat'l Bank of Chic azo, 865 F 2d at 873 
(applying Illinois law), Dell \ Montgomery 
Waid <£ Co. 811 F 2d 970, 972-73 (6th 
Cir 1987) (applying Michigan law), Fletcher 
v Wesley Medical Center, 585 F Supp 
1260, 1264 (D Kan 1984), Hoffman-La 
Roche, Inc. 512 So 2d at 734, Bennett v 
L\anston Hosp, 184 111 App 3d 1030, 133 
111 Dec 113, 114-15, 540 NE2d 979, 980-
81 (1989), Nork, 738 SW2d at 827, 
Castighone \ Johns Hopkins Hosp, 69 
Md App 325, 517 A 2d 786, 793-94 (1986), 
cert denied, 309 Md 325, 523 A 2d 1013 
(1987), Pine River State Bank. 333 N W 2d 
at 627, Bailex. 398 N W 2d at 121-23, Small 
v Svunzs Indus. Inc. 292 S C 481. 357 
SE 2d 452, 455 (1987), on appeal after re-
mand 300 S C 481, 388 S E 2d 808 (1990), 
Messerh v Asamera Minerals, (US) Inc , 
55 Wash App 811, 780 P2d 1327, 1330 
(1989), cf Feiraro v Koelsch, 124 Wis 2d 
154, 368 N W 2 d 666, 671 (1985) (hidden 
disclaimer not effective) 
Dicta in other jurisdictions also support 
such an approach See, e g, Leikvold, 688 
P2d at 174, Foley v Interactixe Data 
Cory . 47 Cal 3d 654, 765 P 2d 373, 387, 
254 CalRptr 211, 225 (Cal 1988), 
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Mich. 408 Mich 579, 292 N W 2d 880, 
895 (1980), Hinson v Cameron, 742 P 2d 
549, 560 (Okla 1987) 
Therefore, at the time the handbook was first distrib-
uted to Johnson, his employment* 1004 was at will 
While it is true that subsequent expressed or implied 
agreements could have modified the at-will employ-
ment relationship,11^ in the instant case the remain-
ing allegations are insufficient to raise a triable issue 
concerning a subsequent modification Aside from 
the handbook itself, Johnson relies only on the fact 
that Thiokol complied with the procedures m the 
handbook during his annual employee appraisals and 
his termination However, by complying with the 
handbook Thiokol did nothing that was inconsistent 
with the at-will employment relationship established 
when the handbook was first distributed to Johnson 
It cannot be reasonably concluded, therefore, that 
Thiokol's actions communicated an intention to alter 
an employment relationship that existed at the time 
the handbook was distributed The trial court was 
correct in granting summary judgment on the ground 
that no implied-in-fact contract provision existed 
between Thiokol and Johnson 
FN 29 Although an implied provision cannot 
contradict an express contract term, 
Bieham, 812 P 2d at 55, an express contract 
can be modified by a subsequent implied 
contract 17A AmJur2d Contracts § 526 
(1991), see also Brooks v Trans World Air-
lines, Inc , 574 F Supp at 810 
Affirmed 
HOWE, AC J , and ZIMMERMAN, J , con-
cur STEWART, Justice (concurring in the result) 
I agree with the majority that plaintiff has failed to 
raise a factual issue as to whether his discharge 
amounted to wrongful termination because it was 
818 P.2d 997, 124 Lab.Cas. P 57,309, 10IER Cases 1871 
(Cite as: 818 P.2d 997) 
without just cause. I write only because the majority 
opinion, in my view, could be somewhat misleading 
with respect to the law governing wrongful termina-
tion. 
An indefinite-term employment contract creating a 
presumption of an at-will relationship may be modi-
fied by the implied-in-fact contract provisions which 
limit an employer's right to terminate an employee. 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1044 
(Utah 1989). The issue in this case is whether plain-
tiff raised a factual dispute as to whether Thiokol's 
express statement in its employee manual that em-
ployment was on an at-will basis was modified by the 
disciplinary procedures outlined in the manual and by 
Thiokol's course of dealings with its employees so 
that Thiokol could discharge for just cause only.— 
FNL The manual's disciplinary procedures 
could have the effect of modifying the ex-
press disclaimer in the sense that both must 
be read together and harmonized in constru-
ing the effect of the manual. This is a ques-
tion of contract construction rather than a 
subsequent modification as that term is gen-
erally used. 
Generally, it is a question of fact as to whether the 
parties acted in a manner to create implied contrac-
tual terms. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 
55-57 (Utah 1991); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 
779 P.2d 668, 670 (Utah 1989). Contract terms im-
plied from the conduct of the parties ordinarily stand 
on an equal footing with express contract terms. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 4, J_9 
(1981).— Implied contract terms may arise from 
statements in an employee manual or from an em-
ployer's course of conduct. Implied terms may pro-
vide that an employee will be discharged only for just 
cause, for particular misconduct, or after certain pro-
cedures have been followed by the employer. The 
actual conduct of the parties may modify an express 
statement in an employment manual that employment 
is only on an at-will basis, just as any contract term 
may be modified by the conduct of the parties. 
FN2. Comment (a) to section 4 of the Re-
statement explains, "Just as assent may be 
manifested by words or other conduct, 
sometimes including silence, so intention to 
make a promise may be manifested in Ian-
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guage or by implication from other circum-
stances." Comment (a) to section 19 adds, 
"[T]here is no distinction in the effect of the 
promise whether it is expressed in writing, 
or orally, or in acts, or partly in one of these 
ways and partly in others." 
The expanding sources of implied contract terms 
have been reviewed in Goetz & Scott, The Limits of 
Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions 
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 
Calif.L.Rev. 261 (1985). The authors observe*1005 
that the traditional common law approach to interpre-
tation of contracts focused first and foremost on the 
written agreement. Thus, "if the document appeared 
clear and unambiguous in its terms, its meaning was 
to be determined from the four corners of the instru-
ment, without resort to extrinsic evidence." Id. at 
273. Now, however, the law increasingly recognizes 
that informal understandings and usages may be im-
plied into contracts. This approach is typified by the 
Uniform Commercial Code: 
The [Uniform Commercial] Code, now joined by 
the Second Restatement of Contracts, effectively 
reverses the common law presumption that the par-
ties' writing and the official law of contract are the 
definitive elements of the agreement. Evidence de-
rived from experience and practice can now trigger 
the incorporation of additional, implied terms. 
Id. at 274. 
In Perty v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 
33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). the United States Supreme 
Court recognized that an employer's de facto policies 
may give rise to a contractually enforceable em-
ployee right to be discharged for just cause only, 
even in the presence of an employee policy manual 
statement to the contrary. Id. at 600, 603, 92 S.Ct. at 
2699, 2700. There are also federal and state court 
decisions which hold that course of conduct may ne-
gate the effect of written disclaimers designed to in-
sulate employers from contractual liability. See, e.g., 
Greene v. Howard Univ.. 412 F.2d 1128, 1134-35 
(D.CCir.1969) (disclaimer asserting no contractual 
duty on the part of employer does not necessarily 
relieve employer of all obligations with respect to the 
observance of its regulations); Karl v. General Mo-
tors Cory., 402 Mich. 926. 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978) 
(reversed lower court's grant of summary judgment, 
818 P.2d 997,124 Lab.Cas. P 57,309, 10IER Cases 1871 
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remanded to consider employee claims regarding 
interpretation of employee handbook and reliance 
thereon, notwithstanding disclaimer purporting to 
limit any employer contractual obligations); Schipani 
v. Ford Motor Co.. 102 Mich.App. 606, 612-14, 302 
N.W.2d 307, 310-11 (1981) (rejected for other rea-
sons in Kostello v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 189 
Mich.App. 241, 472 N.W.2d 71 (1991)) (under ap-
propriate circumstances, oral promises may negate 
the effect of disclaimers which are intended to ab-
solve employers from liability for policies presented 
in employee handbook). — 
FN3. Indeed, some authorities assert that a 
disclaimer in an employee handbook pre-
serving the right to at-will discharge should 
be recognized only when the disclaimer is 
consistent with the employer's de facto em-
ployment policies. See, e.g., Note, Challeng-
ing the Employment-At-Will Doctrine 
Through Modern Contract Theory, 16 
U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 449, 461-63 (1983). 
This Court has held that "an employer's internally 
adopted policies and procedures concerning dis-
charge can be sufficient evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption of at-will employment and can, in effect, 
become part of the contractual relationship between 
the employer and the employee" and that "[b]reach of 
the terms of this contractual relationship can result in 
damages determined as in any other breach of con-
tract action." Caldwell v. Ford. Bacon & Davis Utah, 
Inc.. Ill P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989) (citing Berube. 
Ill P.2d at 1044-46. 1050 (Durham, J., joined by 
Stewart, J.), at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring 
in the result)). That principle may also have the effect 
of overcoming express assertions that a contract is at-
will. 
In the present case, Johnson relies on an implied-in-
fact contract theory. He argues that the procedural 
termination policies set forth in Thiokol's employee 
handbook created an implied-in-fact agreement that 
his employment would be terminated only for just 
cause. Thiokol asserts that the employment relation-
ship was strictly at-will and, therefore, that Johnson 
could be terminated with or without cause. The ma-
jority places great emphasis on the disclaimer in the 
employee handbook which purports to preserve the 
at-will employment relationship, notwithstanding any 
contrary practices by Thiokol and notwithstanding 
the handbook's procedural termination policies. This 
disclaimer is held to be a controlling manifestation of 
Thiokol's intent as to the *1006 nature of the em-
ployment relationship. I think too much weight is 
given that disclaimer. 
If the issue were whether there is a material issue of 
fact as to whether the declared at-will relationship 
had been modified in any way at all by implied terms 
arising from Thiokol's conduct and the other terms in 
the manual, there would be a material issue of fact, 
because Thiokol has indicated in its manual and in 
practice that it terminates employees only after cer-
tain procedures are followed. The employee hand-
book contains a detailed program setting forth spe-
cific rules of conduct, procedures for disciplinary 
actions, including discharge, and procedures for em-
ployee grievances. The handbook also sets forth 
types of conduct for which disciplinary action would 
or could be imposed and the possible consequences. 
Thiokol in fact followed those procedures in the past 
with respect to plaintiff and in the instant case by 
complying with the extensive grievance procedures 
set forth in the manual. Thus, there is clear evidence 
of an implied-in-fact contract term with respect to 
procedures to be followed when an employee is dis-
ciplined or discharged. The statement of these proce-
dures in Thiokol's manual and their implementation 
clearly could remove the employment relationship 
from a strict at-will relationship. To that extent, a jury 
certainly could find that the at-will relationship had 
been modified, notwithstanding the manual's state-
ment that employment was on an at-will basis. 
Nevertheless, that is not what is critical in this case. 
Johnson does not argue that Thiokol failed to comply 
with its own procedures for termination. His com-
plaint is that he could be discharged only with just 
cause and that Thiokol had no just cause. Johnson has 
not produced any evidence, however, that Thiokol's 
termination procedures, its practice of employee per-
formance evaluations, or any of its other employee 
policies, provide a basis for concluding that Thiokol 
can terminate only for just cause. 
In the abstract, it may be arguable that the logical 
implication of the termination procedures adopted by 
Thiokol could be construed to require just cause or 
good faith. However that may be, the evidence in this 
case indicates that the procedures Thiokol has 
adopted are intended to eliminate arbitrary conduct 
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by Thiokol supervisors and to promote a degree of 
uniformity in its firing practices. That does not, on 
the facts of this case, impose an implied contract term 
on Thiokol limiting it to discharge for just cause 
only. If, however, there were evidence that the disci-
plinary procedures were in fact utilized to ensure that 
an employee was discharged only for just cause, then 
a jury could find that Thiokol's declaration that em-
ployment was on an at-will basis might be further 
modified.^ 
FN4, In passing, I note that, on the facts, this 
case is not altogether unlike Brehany v. 
Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 
19911, in which we held that the covenant of 
good faith implied into every contract did 
not modify the terms of an at-will employ-
ment contract to require that an employer 
who discharges an employee have some 
"good faith basis for doing so." 
In sum, Thiokol could not be found to have breached 
any implied terms of an employment contract when it 
discharged Johnson because it followed the proce-
dures set forth in the manual. 
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of 
STEWART. J. 
Utah,1991. 
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